INTRODUCTION
When Electronic Arts Inc. (Electronic Arts) launched its video game series NCAA Football in June 1993, the available technology limited developers to crafting avatars that looked like faceless figurines. 1 Today, however, advancements in digital technology have enabled developers to create "virtual players" that strongly resemble their reallife counterparts.
2 For example, in NCAA Football 12, the avatar that represents University of Florida running back Chris Rainey possesses Chris Rainey's actual height, weight, skin complexion, and hair style. courts have failed to protect the publicity rights of Division I college athletes. 9 Instead, they have created a First Amendment loophole to circumvent college athletes' rights. 10 This Article argues that despite First Amendment concerns, courts should protect college athletes' publicity rights in commercial video games. Part I of this Article discusses the status of the American college athlete and the practice of licensing intellectual property rights from colleges to video game publishers. Part II introduces the state-law right of publicity-an intellectual property right that protects commercial interests in one's own likeness. Part III explains why Electronic Arts's video games violate the publicity rights of college football players. Part IV explains why courts should not allow video game publishers to hide behind a First Amendment defense when publishers are using exact depictions of college football players' likenesses. Finally, Part V concludes that even if a video game publisher were to create an avatar that partially transforms a college athlete's likeness, the courts should still recognize some liability in the video game publisher for the use of the nontransformed aspects of the college athlete's identity.
I. THE STATUS OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE ATHLETE AND THE PRACTICE OF LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FROM
COLLEGES TO VIDEO GAME PUBLISHERS
A. The Status of the American College Athlete
College athletes represent a unique class of celebrity within American society. 11 On the one hand, college athletes are revered for
Missouri the elements of a right of publicity action as including "(1) [t] hat defendant used plaintiff's name as a symbol of his identity (2) without consent (3) and with the intent to obtain a commercial advantage") (internal citations and quotations omitted); Uhlaender, 316 F.Supp. at 1279 (D. Minn. 1970) (treating a breach of the right of publicity as constituting "appropriation for commercial benefit of the plaintiff's name or likeness"). 9. See, e.g., Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 760 (rejecting a college athlete's right of publicity claim in the context of a commercial video game); cf. O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 169-70 (5th Cir. 1941) (holding that a college football player could not make a claim for breach of his right of privacy for the use of his picture in a beer advertisement where the beer manufacturer had purchased rights to the picture directly from the athlete's college).
10. See Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 783-84 (noting that even though video game publishers "walk a fine line . . . [of] exploiting the hard-earned reputations of college players for [their] own profit," protecting a limited number of "creative elements" in Electronic Arts's video game is more important than protecting collegiate athletes' rights to control the use of their own identities); see also id. at 784 (noting that "there are sufficient elements of [one's] own expression found in [Electronic Arts's college-sports video games] that justify . . . First Amendment protection"). 
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their strength, agility, and skill. 12 But on the other hand, college athletes are generally prohibited from earning money based on their athletic talents. 13 This general prohibition arises from the NCAA's Principle of Amateurism, which states that "student-athletes shall be amateurs in intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental [,] and social benefits to be derived." 14 Based upon this Principle of Amateurism, the NCAA requires its athletes to decline salaries for playing their sport, and to reject remuneration, in any form, offered in connection with their status as athletes. 15 In addition, the NCAA deems college athletes ineligible to compete in sporting events if they "permit[] the use of [their] name or picture to advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a commercial product or service of any kind." 16 Trouble for College Athletes, LEDGER-ENQUIRER (Columbus, GA), Aug. 13, 2011, available at http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/2011/08/13/1692325/stephanie-pedersen-commentary.html ("Whether you like it or not, high school recruits and college athletes are celebrities.").
12. urism%2Bhas%2Bevolved%2Bover%2Btime%2B-%2B1-3-00.html (same, from the perspective of the NCAA). It was then adopted by the NCAA upon its inception in 1906 as a way to protect its members from competing for the services of premier athletic labor, even though few American athletes were from privileged families. See id. (noting that when the NCAA first adopted its Principle of Amateurism in 1906, the association of member colleges was "known as the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States").
14. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 13, at § 2. [W] hile the NCAA trumpets its philosophy of amateur competition, an increasing refrain points to the hypocritical nature of the Association, as its financial success is built on the sweat of amateur athletes."); Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 354-55 (" [T] he assumption that so-called student-athletes in high profile Division I football and basketball programs are students first and athletes second may reflect more of an idealistic fantasy than modern reality. . . . [T] hey are inextricably intertwined with university activities that are irrefutably commercial."); Branch, supra note 5, at 2 ("The NCAA makes money, and enables universities and corporations to make money, from the unpaid labor of young athletes.").
18. See, e.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. 
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In the absence of a practical means to license the use of college athletes' likenesses, publishers are left to consider how to make their games as realistic as possible without infringing upon rights they do not own. Without any perfect course of action, the company that currently enjoys an exclusive license to use NCAA logos in college football games, Electronic Arts, has adopted the strategy of producing video games that use college athletes' virtual images and biographical data but not their actual names. 22 This strategy, however, is somewhat troubling because Electronic Arts's virtual players are still easily identifiable as their real-life counterparts based on their jersey numbers, positions, physical characteristics (height and weight), physical abilities, and biographical details. 23 Furthermore, NCAA Football users are able to easily identify virtual players as their real-life counterparts based on a game feature that allows users to add surnames to the back of virtual players' jerseys. 24 Once a user adds surnames, the game announcer will then refer to each avatar by the designated surname. 25 Thus, even though Electronic Arts does not explicitly market a game that includes avatars that bear the names of college athletes, the ultimate result is, in essence, no different. It is on this basis that some college football players contend that Electronic Arts violates their publicity rights.
26

II. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: A STATE-LAW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHT
A. Introduction to the Right of Publicity
The "right of publicity" is a state-law intellectual property right that serves "to protect the commercial interest of celebrities and their identities." 27 In some states, the right of publicity arises entirely from the sale or use of a commercial product," video game publishers cannot easily enter into licensing agreements with college athletes. statute. 28 In others, it arises from common law principles set forth in an 1890 law review article written by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis and attorney Samuel Warren. 29 Meanwhile, in yet a third set of states, courts recognize both a statutory and common law right of publicity.
30
In almost all states, a prima facie claim for violating one's right of publicity requires the showing of four elements: (1) the use of one's identity; (2) for purposes of a commercial advantage; (3) without consent; and (4) in a manner that causes monetary harm. 31 If the plaintiff is able to make a prima facie showing of the breach of his publicity rights, the court will then balance the plaintiff's right of publicity claim against potential affirmative defenses, including First Amendment defenses. man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph. . . . Whether it be labeled a 'property' right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag 'property' simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth.").
28. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (1984) ("Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods, or services, without such person's prior consent, or, in the case of a minor, the prior consent of his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof."); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 1449(A) (1986) ("Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods, or services, without such person's prior consent . . . shall be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof, and any profits from the unauthorized use that are attributable to the use shall be taken into account in computing the actual damages.").
29. The exact scope of circumstances that will satisfy the first element of any right of publicity claim, "use of one's identity," is unclear, but may at the least be satisfied by the use of someone else's actual name or likeness. 33 In addition, most courts deem the "use of one's identity" to include any drawing, sculpture, or design that is intended to represent a particular individual-irrespective of whether that person is mentioned by name. 34 For instance, in Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that a composite drawing of a naked African-American man in a boxing ring that contained many of the facial features of boxer Muhammad Ali had used the former heavyweight champion's identity. 35 Similarly, in Young v. Greneker Studios, Inc., the New York Supreme Court held that a mannequin that was modeled after the plaintiff had used her identity.
36
In this same vein, most courts have found the "use of one's identity" to extend to the impersonation of one's likeness either electronically or through other forms of new media. 37 
Commercial Advantage
The second element of a breach of publicity rights claim, "commercial advantage," includes the use of goodwill of another's name or identity for purposes of making a profit.
42 "Profit alone," however, does not necessarily "render expression 'commercial.'" 43 For instance, though the use of one's name or identity for purposes of writing a biography does not violate this prong of the analysis, "the use of that same data . . . in connection with a [moneymaking] project" poses a likely violation. 44 The most traditional category of "commercial advantage" involves the use of an individual's name or likeness for advertising and 
Without Consent
The third element of analysis, "without consent," is met whenever a party uses another's identity without the rights-holder's permission. 49 A plaintiff seeking to state a claim rarely has much difficulty satisfying this element. 50 However, a plaintiff may fail to meet the "without consent" element if he previously licensed the right to use his likeness to the defendant, or if he had previously licensed the right to use his likeness to a third party that later sublicenses the right to the defendant. 
Monetary Harm
Finally, a claim for breach of one's publicity rights requires a plaintiff to show monetary harm. 52 Thus, in stark contrast with the right of privacy's requirement of showing damages to one's feelings, the right of publicity requires the showing of an actual financial impact.
53
The traditional measure of damages for the breach of one's right of publicity "focuses on [either] the pecuniary loss to the plaintiff or the unjust pecuniary gain to the defendant."
54 Typically, either calculation would lead a court to the same result-awarding a payment in the amount of the fair market value of the use of one's likeness for the particular purpose.
C. The First Amendment Defense
If a plaintiff is able to meet its prima facie burden, the court will next consider potential affirmative defenses.
56 Among these affirmative defenses, the ones most frequently invoked involve the First Amendment. 57 
2013]
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because the right of publicity is a state-generated right that restricts free speech, courts must "directly balance the magnitude of the speech restriction against the asserted governmental interest in protecting the intellectual property right."
59
This direct balancing is not an easy task. 60 According to one leading treatise on the issue:
In some cases of media use of human identity, there is indeed a conflict with the First Amendment. It is real. It will not go away. . . . There is no neatly packaged general rule that can be waved like a magic wand to make the solution any easier. The balance must be laboriously hacked out case by case. 61 Nevertheless, even despite a lack of clear "judicial consensus . . . on the contours of the First Amendment vis-à-vis the right of publicity," three factors substantially shape the outcome of any court's balancing analysis.
62 First, courts generally grant broader First Amendment protection to speech that informs the public about matters of "public he First Amendment requires that the right to be protected from unauthorized publicity be balanced against the public interest in the dissemination of news and information") (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added); cf. Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 775 (noting that courts throughout the country have adopted "up to eight 'balancing' tests that attempt to weight the First Amendment rights . . . against the right of publicity").
60. Next, courts award broader protection to speech that "contains significant transformative elements," which extend beyond the mere literal depiction of a celebrity. 65 In other words, courts are more likely to protect speech that is the synthesis of a variety of sources than speech that "is the very sum and substance of the work in question. [t]he inquiry is whether the celebrity likeness is one of the raw materials from which an original work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in question.") (internal quotations omitted); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P. 
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Finally, courts are most inclined to protect speech that does not thwart innovation. 67 To illustrate this point, the U.S. Electronic Arts's use of college athletes' likenesses in its college football video games does not convey a political message.
C. College Athletes Do Not Consent to the Use of Their Identities in These Video Games
Similarly, with respect to the third element, lack of consent, there is little doubt that most college athletes do not consent to Electronic Arts's use of their likenesses in video games. 86 This is especially true in light of the NCAA Principle of Amateurism, which, if enforced, would take away college sports eligibility from any athlete that granted such consent. 87 A remote argument, appearing in the lawsuit O'Bannon v. NCAA, suggests that college athletes might implicitly consent to the use of their likenesses by signing the Student-Athlete Statement, which states that college athletes agree to abide by the NCAA Bylaws and to allow the NCAA's subsequent licensing of their intellectual property rights in certain contexts. 88 However, this argument is doubtful for at least four reasons. 89 First, the rights purportedly assigned by college athletes to the NCAA in the Student-Athlete Statement are limited to those rights implicated when "promot [ Second, even to the extent that a court were to find the meaning of "promotion of NCAA championship events" to be ambiguous, an important maxim of contract law is that a court must interpret any ambiguities in contracts against the interests of the drafter. 92 Therefore, recognizing that the Student-Athlete Statement was drafted by the NCAA, any uncertainty as to whether college sports video games fall within the set of categories that "promote NCAA championships" must, again, be interpreted in the negative. 93 Third, even presuming for the sake of argument that college athletes license their publicity rights to the NCAA via the Student-Athlete Statement, there is still no readily available evidence that the NCAA ever attempted to sublicense those rights to Electronic Arts.
Finally, even presuming that the Student-Athlete Statement and some theoretical subsequent contract were deemed to grant Electronic Arts the right to use college athletes' likenesses, a court still might find this arrangement void based on two grounds. 94 First, a court might find the Student-Athlete Statement void due to lack of consideration with respect to non-scholarship college athletes, because the NCAA does not incur any legal detriment in exchange for the acquisition of college athletes' publicity rights. 95 Second, a court might deem such an arrangement void due to illegality under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 96 The reason for this holding would be that any agreement among all of the NCAA member schools to require college athletes to sign such a statement is tantamount to an agreement to "fix the price 91. See id. (quoting language assigning aspects of student-athletes' rights of publicity to the NCAA and its member schools Lastly, the fourth element of any right of publicity claim, monetary harm, is also likely met. 98 A court could easily calculate the monetary harm to college athletes by calculating the pecuniary gain derived from the use of their identities. 99 For example, recognizing that Electronic Arts currently pays $35 million per year for the rights to use the names and likenesses of National Football League players in a similar video game, this amount could serve as a reasonable approximation of the monetary harm caused by Electronic Arts's gain. 100 Of course, one potentially complicating factor in ascertaining the monetary harm for Electronic Arts's use of college athletes' likenesses is that by signing the National Letter of Intent and thereafter the Student-Athlete Statement, college athletes consent to forgo any pecuniary gains from the use of their likenesses during their college careers pursuant to the NCAA Principle of Amateurism. 101 Thus, the actual pecuniary loss suffered by college athletes for the misappropriation of their likenesses may not perfectly align with the pecuniary gain enjoyed by Electronic Arts as the free-riding party. 102 Nevertheless, the NCAA Principle of Amateurism is a private association's mandate and not a rule of law. 103 Thus, college athletes are entitled to compensation based on the unauthorized use of their 2013]
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likenesses, irrespective of the NCAA's position on allowing college athletes to affirmatively sell the rights to use their identities. 104 In addition, the use of college athletes' likenesses in current video games may have a negative impact on college athletes' ability to license their likenesses upon graduation for use in other video games. 105 Thus, even if a court were inclined to enforce the NCAA Principle of Amateurism for the time period during which college athletes compete in their sport, doing so still should not bar college athletes from collecting on the misuse of their likenesses once they are no longer eligible for intercollegiate competition.
106
With this distinction in mind, any court that seeks to honor both college athletes' publicity rights and the NCAA Principle of Amateurism could do so by simply ordering infringing video game publishers to pay damages into a trust fund.
107 From this trust fund, a trustee could disburse each college athlete's share as soon as the athlete is ineligible to participate in collegiate athletics.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROTECT ELECTRONIC ARTS'S USE OF COLLEGE ATHLETES' IDENTITIES
Presuming that a reviewing court finds each of the four above elements met, a proper analysis of Electronic Arts's liability next turns to assessing potential affirmative defenses, beginning with an analysis of the First Amendment defense. 109 In balancing college athletes' rights of publicity against Electronic Arts's freedom of speech, a court must consider each of the three relevant factors referenced in Section II.C:
104. See id. at § § 12.1.2(a), 12.02.2 (defining "pay" as it applies to the disqualification of student-athletes (1) whether Electronic Arts's speech is in the public interest; (2) whether the speech contains significant transformative elements; and (3) whether the speech provides a disincentive for college athletes to innovate in light of their current compensation structure.
110
A. The "Public Interest" Defense
As discussed in Section II.C, the "public interest" defense emanates from the notion that certain speech is so newsworthy, political, informative, or critical that it requires additional protection based on the intrinsic rights of the public interest.
111 Thus, the heightened protection of public interest speech rests not only on the rights of the speaker, but also on "'the right of the public to know and the freedom of the press to tell it. '" 112 Although the precise definition of "public interest speech" varies by court, it would be a far cry to treat the use of players' likenesses in today's sports video games as within the public interest. 113 Reason being, even though the public enjoys Electronic Arts's video games, these video games do not convey details about past events of importance, nor do they serve as an artistic vehicle to communicate a message, either supporting or criticizing collegiate sports. Motions to Dismiss and Electronic Arts's Anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike, supra note 59, at 12 (noting that Electronic Arts's video game series NCAA Football "is unlike the works in Gionfriddo [because NCAA Football] does not merely report or publish Plaintiff's statistics and abilities. On the contrary, [Electronic Arts] enables the consumer to assume the identity of various student athletes and compete in simulated college football matches."); id. at 12-13 (contrasting the use of college athletes' identities from video games from those involving fantasy sports games because a sports video game does not depend on updated reports of the real-life players' progress and include depictions of athletes' likenesses in avatar form).
115. Nevertheless, the court's holding in Hart is questionable, as it seems to misapply existing case law on this point. 120 Most notably, the court in Hart cited to a general rule that found "strong support" for finding speech to be commercial where: (1) the speech appears in an advertisement; (2) the speech refers to a specific product or service; and (3) the speaker has an economic motivation for his speech. 121 However, the court incorrectly interpreted this general rule to mean that an absence of any one of these three elements always negates the possibility of finding particular speech to be commercial. 122 Such a conclusion not only goes beyond the scope of the earlier case law, but it also misunderstands how to construct a contrapositive argument-one of the most basic rules of logical reasoning. 
B. There is No Transformative Element to Electronic Arts's Speech
In addition to balancing the public purpose of speech against the right of publicity, a court must also inquire as to whether there exists a "transformative element" that protects the speech. 124 In the context of depicting digital images in video games, most courts have concluded that a transformative element is one that makes a celebrity's likeness no longer the "sum and substance of the work in question," but rather, "one of the raw materials from which an original work is synthesized."
125 In other words, "[i]f the product containing the celebrity's likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the defendant's own expression of what he or she is trying to create or portray . . . it is protected."
126 By contrast, "merely merchandising a celebrity's image without that person's consent . . . does not amount to a transformative use." 127
Applying the Transformative Element Test in the Video Game Context
Recently, several courts have considered whether using celebrity likenesses in video games is transformative. In the earliest of these cases, Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., the Court of Appeals of California held that there were sufficient transformative elements to protect Sega's incorporation of attributes from singer Kierin Kirby into the character Ulala-"a young, fictional, elongated, and extremely thin female reporter . . . who works for a news channel called Space Channel 5" in the twenty-fifth century. 128 In deciding that case, the court concluded that Ulala was a "fanciful, creative character" and not simply a symbol of Kierin Kirby's likeness. 129 The court reached this conclusion for five separate reasons: (1) Ulala's extremely tall, slender computer-generated physique was dissimilar from Kirby's physique; (2) Ulala was based in part on the Japanese style of "anime"; (3) Ulala's hairstyle and costumes differed from those worn by Kirby; (4) the dance moves performed by Ulala were different from those performed by Kirby; and (5) the Ulala character was not placed in modern time, but rather in a fanciful space-age setting from the twenty-fifth century. Indeed, even after these distortions, the avatars still resemble the actual athletes. 143 In addition, the court in Hart seemed to err in presuming that a video game's inclusion of "virtual stadiums, athletes, coaches, fans, sound effects, music, and commentary" makes the video game sufficiently transformative. 144 This presumption fails to account for the language of the U. 
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Cards, which explained that First Amendment protection applies only where "a product containing a celebrity's likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the defendant's own expression rather than the celebrity's likeness." 145 Indeed, if simply adding a decorative background insulated video game publishers from any liability, then all video game publishers would opt to create new backgrounds rather than purchasing publicity rights from celebrities.
146
A third likely error in Hart was that the case relied on Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc. as support for the position that a decorative background makes the use of a celebrity's likeness transformative. 147 However, a careful reading of Kirby explains that the case was about far more than just a decorative background. 148 In Kirby, the video game character Ulala was placed in an entirely fanciful time and place: outer space, several centuries into the future.
149 By contrast, the college-athlete avatars in Electronic Arts's NCAA Football video game appear as digital replicas of themselves, performing in actual college football stadiums.
150 Clearly, the two are not the same.
151
Meanwhile, yet a fourth likely error in Hart involves the way that the court pointed to "[t]he malleability of the player's image [to suggest] that the image serves as an art-imitating-life starting point for the game playing experience" and that "the technology that permits users to alter a player's image is itself a noteworthy, expressive attribute of the game."
152 This interpretation is misguided because the malleability feature in NCAA Football gives users the ability to alter the attributes of avatars to more closely resemble those of actual players.
153
In addition, this feature gives users the ability to add college athletes' actual names to the back of avatar jerseys. 154 These are both clearly infringing uses. 155 Typically, courts have held that when a technology either induces or encourages infringement, the publishers of the technology are liable for the resulting wrongdoing. 156 Here, the 162 In applying this factor, recent courts have shown an increasing reluctance to protect professional athletes' publicity rights when faced with a First Amendment defense because professional athletes "are rewarded, and handsomely, too, for their participation in games." 163 At first glance, one may presume this same line of case law is relevant to collegiate athletes, who also enjoy great fame for playing their sport. 164 However, a close inspection of the plight of the modern college athlete indicates that college athletes, especially in the sport of football, are more akin to apprentices or interns than to highly compensated professional athletes. 165 Indeed, according to a recent report entitled The Price of Poverty in Big Time College Sports, more than 85% of college athletes live below the federal poverty line. 166 Because protecting the publicity rights of college athletes redistributes wealth in a downward direction, this final factor strongly points in favor of protecting college athletes' publicity rights as a means to encourage their continued performance and innovation as athletes. 
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In light of such self-serving attempts by video game publishers to use the First Amendment as a shield, courts should change their view of the existing balancing test to recognize that even a partial, albeit incomplete, transformation of a celebrity's likeness would not entirely absolve liability under a proper right of publicity balancing test. 177 Rather, in such contexts, courts should treat the partially transformative element as simply a mitigating factor to liability, and then assign damages based on the proportionate share of the celebrity's original likeness still in the final avatar.
178
This slightly revised version of a transformative element inquiry within the greater scope of a First Amendment balancing test could continue to place the initial burden on a plaintiff to show a prima facie case of breach of his publicity rights. 179 In addition, once this burden is met, the burden could still shift to the defendant to argue in favor of First Amendment preemption. 180 However, under a revised test, the inquiry's third stage would change, requiring the burden to shift back to the plaintiff to argue that the transformative element represents a partial, rather than full, transformation of the plaintiff's identity. 181 If a court agrees that the transformation is merely partial, the plaintiff would still be entitled to damages, measurable based on the proportionate share of the defendant's likeness that remains in the virtual player.
182
Every Game, supra note 77 and explanatory parenthetical.
176. See TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 374 (noting that a weakness with the traditional application of the transformative element tests is that "[t]hough these tests purport to balance the prospective interests involved, there is no balancing at all-once the use is determined to be expressive, it is protected," and "[i]f a product is being sold that predominantly exploits the commercial value of an individual's identity, that product should be held to violate the right of publicity and not be protected by the First Amendment").
177. In other words, courts should treat the partial transformation of one's likeness as a factor toward mitigating damages; whereas courts treat the public interest defense as a bar on recovering any damages.
178. See infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text (discussing how a similar concept today is used in torts with respect to the doctrine of contributory negligence); see also infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text (explaining how this concept coincides with the property law doctrine of shared property rights).
179. Treating the use of a partial transformative element as a means of mitigating damages rather than as a complete bar to recovery coincides with the U.S. legal system's broad movement toward apportioning liability rather than treating it as absolute. 183 In addition, this approach is consistent with modern property theory, which recognizes that "where more than one party has a valid claim to a single piece of property, the court will recognize an undivided interest in the property in proportion to the strength of the claim."
184 Finally, it should be noted that this approach comports with the important principles of economic efficiency and fairness by exposing even a partial free rider to liability and disgorging the free rider's unjust enrichment. . . as a means of mitigating the harshness of the common law contributory negligence defense. A system of contributory negligence completely bars a plaintiff from recovery against a negligent defendant if the plaintiff's negligence is a proximate cause of his damages. A system of comparative negligence apportions the relative negligence of the parties and reduces the plaintiff's recovery according to his degree of fault. Although the defense of contributory negligence remains under the comparative negligence system, the plaintiff's negligence reduces, rather than bars, his award of damages. The comparative negligence system is fairer than the system based on the all-or-nothing contributory negligence defense because under the former a negligent plaintiff may recover for damages proximately caused by the defendant's negligence.").
184. See, e.g., Popov v. Hayashi, 2002 WL 31833731 at *8 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002) (ultimately finding that both a baseball spectator who initially undertook significant steps to achieve possession of a home run baseball and a spectator who ultimately recovered baseball had property right interests in the baseball).
185. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 51 (3d. ed. 1986) (explaining that the law "may be viewed as an effort to attach costs to the violation of moral principles-principles that . . . operate to enhance the efficiency of a market economy"). simple. 192 College athletes could even sell their names and likenesses to publishers without violating the NCAA Principle of Amateurism if they require publishers to make payment into a trust fund on their behalf. 193 Most agree that college athletes provide "the most essential ingredient of any NCAA sports product." 194 However, for far too long, courts have used technicalities to deny college athletes the fruits of their labor. 195 This result was especially evident in the case of Hart v. Electronic Arts, in which the First Amendment defense was used as just another legal fiction to allow both Electronic Arts and the NCAA to continue to exploit college athletes' work product. 196 To protect the future interests of college athletes, courts must recognize that the scales of justice point in favor of protecting college athletes' publicity rights in commercial video games. 197 Furthermore, courts must modify how they interpret right of publicity laws to ensure that video game publishers cannot use the mere partial transformation of college athletes' avatars as a loophole to avoid providing college athletes with their fair share of video game profits. 198 192. See Edelman, supra note 17, at 887-88 (noting that, unlike full deregulation of NCAA labor markets, allowing college athletes to control their publicity rights "does not involve any payment from educational institutions to student-athletes, and therefore is free from the regulation's scope").
193. See Cohen, supra note 107 (noting that sports business author Marc Isenberg believes that there is a way without violating NCAA bylaws to "create a trust fund for athletes, funded by revenue from TV rights payments").
194. See, e.g., Lazaroff, supra note 13, at 354. 195. See, e.g., Banks v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 977 F.2d 1081, 1091 (7th Cir. 1992) (denying a college football player the right to challenge an NCAA rule under antitrust law based on the court's conclusion that the NCAA member schools are not "'purchasers of labor'" in the traditional sense); O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1941) (holding that a college football player could not make a claim for breach of his right of privacy for the use of his picture in a beer advertisement where the beer manufacturer had purchased rights to the picture directly from the athlete's college).
196. 
